Writing
Industry observations written from an IT operator's vantage inside a Chinese OEM's German operation. Personal opinion only — drawn from public sources, and not affiliated with any employer.
AI agents broke the lean team's two oldest problems in the same year. The fix starts with a different question.
AI agents were pitched to lean IT teams as the cure for their two oldest diseases, the bus factor and shadow IT. The cure worked, and that is the problem. Underneath both failures sits a question IAM never had to answer: not who can access what, but who, or what, may act in the company's name, with how much autonomy, under whose authority. Includes an operating model sized for a five-person shop.
Building in Europe is sold as de-risking. On one line it does the opposite — and the meter that proves it reads near-zero today, climbs for a decade, and sits on no single person's dashboard.
Localising production in Europe is sold to Chinese carmakers as de-risking. On one line it does the opposite: build deeply enough to earn the tariff break and you switch on CBAM, a carbon meter that reads near-zero today and climbs for a decade — pointing the opposite way to the slide. The real danger isn't the biggest cost or the visible wall; it's the un-owned meter no one was assigned to total.
本地化被当成降风险。可在某一条线上，它正好相反——那块证明它的表，今天读数接近零，却要涨十年，而且不在任何一个人的仪表盘上。
在欧洲建厂，被当作给中国车企降风险。但有一条线上它正好相反：造得够深、深到能拿关税减免，就同时打开了 CBAM——一块今天读数接近零、却要涨十年的碳表，方向跟立项 PPT 上写的相反。真正的危险不是最大的成本，也不是那堵看得见的墙，而是那块没人被安排去汇总的表。
MIP 不是温柔版关税。它把钱还给没打价格战的人，逼一直打价格战的人涨价 —— 同时把价格战这件事，从所有人手里收走。
2026 年初，欧盟"取消"了对中国电动车的关税。但其实关税没有消失，只是被换成了一个"最低限价"（MIP）。这两个东西完全不是一回事 —— 而它对不同的中国车企，会导向完全不同的命运：把钱还给那些没打价格战的人，同时逼那些一直靠价格战抢份额的人涨价。
Europe's new price floor for Chinese EVs isn't a softer tariff. It hands the money back to some carmakers, forces a price rise on the rest — and ends the price war for all of them.
Europe is replacing its China-EV tariffs with a price floor — a minimum import price set by law to have "equivalent effect to the duty." Read that carefully and a sorting falls out: the floor hands the tariff money back to the carmakers who weren't fighting on price, and forces a price rise on the ones who were. Either way, the price war is over — and the price war was the whole game for the brands that had nothing else.
为什么欧洲市场下一阶段的胜负，不再是销量，而是运营能力
经销商数量是投入指标，不是产出指标。到 2027 年，2024-25 年卖到欧洲的第一批中国电车将满三岁——质保缓冲变薄，残值开始按真实使用数据重新定价，不再靠预测撑着。哪些品牌进 2029 年的第一梯队，哪些长期留在靠价格战和补贴租赁的第二梯队，决定胜负的不是开了多少店，而是店底下那套运营栈有没有建起来——或者租到手。
Three operational moats your China playbook didn't teach you to build — and one timing problem you cannot fix in 2027.
Dealer count is the input metric, not the output. By 2027 the first wave of Chinese-brand EVs sold into Europe will be three years old, and residual value will be re-priced on real ownership data. Which Chinese brands enter the 2029 first tier depends less on how many points of sale they open than on whether they build — or rent — the operational stack underneath.